Impact of Agency Risks and Task Uncertainty on Venture Capitalist–CEO Interaction
研究了代理风险和任务不确定性如何影响风险投资家与CEO的互动频率，发现目标一致性、CEO经验、企业阶段和技术创新程度有显著影响，但管理层持股比例无影响。
This study examined the impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalist-chief executive officer (VC-CEO) interaction. Results from 51 VC-CEO dyads indicate that the frequency of interaction depends on the extent of VC-CEO goal congruence, the degree of the CEO's new venture experience, the venture's stage of development, and the degree of technical innovation it is pursuing. However, contrary to conventional expectations, the degree of management ownership had no impact on the frequency of interaction.