Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands
在动态模型中证明，当后续有类似产品由其他卖家提供且竞拍者想要多个物品时，早期卖家有动机使用一口价。一口价提高了第一场拍卖的收入，但降低了第二场拍卖和总收入，并导致拍卖序列无效率。
Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.