Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owner's Curse
证明，持有目标公司股份的竞标者会激进出价，甚至可能支付过高；若允许撤回出价，激进程度更高。无持股的竞标者则会压低出价。目标公司若只接受不可撤回的出价，可增加竞争并提高预期售价。
This article demonstrates that a potential acquirer with a toehold bids aggressively and possibly overpays in equilibrium. The aggressiveness of a bidder with a toehold increases further if he is able to renege on his winning bid. A bidder without a toehold, however, responds by shading his bids. The target firm can increase competition and the expected sale price if it only entertains nonretractable bids. This article provides testable implications on the probability of bidder success, stock price reactions on bid revisions and on resolution of the contest, and expected gains to bidders and the target firm.