On the Licensing of Innovations
研究一个三阶段非对称双寡头博弈，发现重大创新不会被许可，而效率相同的企业倾向于许可小创新；某些情况下许可对社会和私人都不利。
We study a three-stage, asymmetric duopoly game of RD (2) fixed-fee licensing of the innovation; and (3) sale of the final product. We find that major innovations will not be licensed, but that equally efficient firms will tend to license minor innovations. For some innovations, licensing is both privately and socially undesirable. If at least one of the two producers would refuse to license (were it to acquire the innovation), then licensing will not occur; an excluding firm will obtain the innovation. The possibility of licensing may decrease the returns to innovation if the licensee appropriates most of the licensing gains to trade.