Loan Sales and Relationship Banking
研究银行在二级市场出售贷款的行为如何影响企业融资结构，发现贷款市场流动性并非总是社会最优，存在对高评级贷款交易过度、对风险债券流动性不足的问题，并提出风险资本要求的政策含义。
ABSTRACT Firms raise money from banks and the bond market. Banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information. Liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms' optimal financial structure. The endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal: There is excessive trade in highly rated names, and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds. We provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets, and bond markets. Further, we posit that risk‐based capital requirements may be socially desirable.