Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing
研究线性不确定需求和仿射条件期望信息结构下，古诺寡头企业间信息共享的激励。发现无信息共享是唯一均衡，但随着信息量增加，非共享均衡趋近于共享策略，企业数量增多时竞争均衡实现效率。
ABSTRAC Tniis paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a Cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure.No information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible.However, the nonpooling equilibrium converges to th e situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases.Hence, the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large.