Incentive Problems and General Partner Compensation in Limited Partnership Real Estate Investments
研究房地产有限合伙投资中，普通合伙人的薪酬结构能否缓解其虚报项目现金流的代理问题，发现高声誉合伙人前期薪酬更高，且薪酬结构随管理专业度和投资风险变化。
When a general partner raises capital for a real estate syndication, prospective investors should price‐protect against incentives of the general partner to misrepresent project cash flows. In this study, I evaluate the structure of the general partner's compensation and specific project characteristics to determine if compensation structure can mitigate agency costs. Results indicate that front‐end compensation is higher for the high reputation general partner and that the compensation structure varies with the degree of management expertise required and the financial risks of the investment.