Incentive Compensation and Promotion-Based Incentives of Mid-Level Managers: Evidence from a Multinational Corporation
研究利用一家大型跨国公司的薪酬数据，发现中层管理者的奖金激励强度与其晋升空间负相关，即晋升机会越少，奖金激励越强，支持了显性激励与隐性激励相互替代的理论。
ABSTRACT: This study re-examines the hypothesis that explicit, compensation-based incentives of mid-level managers are adjusted to the level of implicit incentives provided by the possibility of moving to higher-level positions. Using compensation data from a large multinational corporation, I find that, after controlling for the position’s scope and level of accountability, bonus-based incentives are stronger for managers who (1) have fewer organizational levels left to climb, (2) face weaker implicit incentives from getting promoted to the next level, and (3) face weaker implicit incentives from getting promoted to the top of the organization. The findings are consistent with the notion that implicit incentives are taken into consideration in the design of explicit incentive contracts. In particular, the results support the prediction that explicit incentives are optimally stronger in situations with weaker implicit incentives.