Deregulation, Reregulation, Equity Ownership, and S&L Risk-Taking
研究储蓄贷款机构股权结构与其破产风险的关系，发现经理持股比例高的机构在监管宽松期（1988年）风险承担更大，在监管严格期（1991年）风险承担更小；机构投资者持股比例高的机构在1991年破产风险更低。
This study examines the relation between equity ownership composition and insolvency risk for savings and loans (S&Ls). We hypothesize that the effect of manager/stockholder alignments on bank risk-taking is contingent on the trade-off between stockholders' incentives for risk provided by deposit insurance subsidies and their disincentives based on the regulatory price for risk imposed under alternative regulatory regimes. In support of this hypothesis, we find that S&Ls with a high concentration of managerial stock ownership exhibit greater risk-taking behavior than other S&Ls in 1988, a period of regulatory leniency and forbearance on S&L closures, but lower risk-taking behavior in 1991, a period of regulatory stringency and nonforbearance. We also find S&Ls with a greater institutional investor ownership to have lower insolvency risk than other S&Ls in 1991.