Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier
研究卖方在体验品质量选择中的道德风险如何阻碍市场进入，指出打带跑式进入会导致低质量选择，买家因此不愿购买，而规模效应和优惠策略可能缓解但无法在规模报酬不变下奏效。
Moral hazard, such as arises in a seller's choice of quality of an experience good, can lead to a barrier to entry.In particular, hit-and-run entry is likely to lead to low quality choice, and, if buyers foresee that, they will be unwilling to buy from an entrant.The scale of entry may affect quality incentives, and therefore introductory offers may assure buyers of an entrant's quality, but this cannot happen under constant returns .