Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model
利用IPO公司调查与档案数据，扩展行为代理模型，研究薪酬合同中的不同风险形式对高管感知风险承担的影响，发现就业风险和薪酬波动促进风险承担，而下行风险和股票期权内在价值抑制风险承担。
Abstract Employing survey and archival data from a sample of IPO firms, and extending the ideas of the Behavioral Agency Model, this study examines the influence of various forms of risk bearing created within the compensation contract on perceived risk taking. The results show that employment risk and variability in compensation each corresponds to greater risk taking, while downside risk and the intrinsic value of stock options correspond to lower risk taking. Among the implications from these results are the importance CEOs attach to relatively stable forms of pay, and to drawing distinctions between the potential for loss of pay and uncertainty about the amount of future pay. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.