Optimal Incentives for Teams
指出传统静态激励理论不切实际，引入代理人之间的长期互动，研究显性激励与工作组织如何利用和影响重复互动产生的隐性激励，发现最优方案具有低强度团队激励等特征。
Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term interaction among agents, and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit, and interact with, the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular “teams,” such as the use of low-powered, group incentives.