Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales
构建实证模型，区分投标者合谋与供给效应，发现合谋模型优于标准拍卖模型，且合谋对中标价的影响大于供给效应。
Allegations of bidder collusion at Forest Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest were common in the 1970s. Of course, prices may be low for reasons other than collusion. The authors formulate an empirical model that allows for both bidder collusion and supply effects and in which they control for demand conditions. Noncooperative behavior in which a single unit is sold (the standard auction model) is a special case: it is found to be definitively outperformed by a model of collusion. The authors also find that supply effects are dominated by collusion in determining the winning bids in the market. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.