The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry
研究输电容量如何影响发电商之间的竞争，发现有限容量可能激励企业策略性限制产出以造成拥堵，并应用于加州放松管制市场，表明小投资可大幅促进竞争。
In an unregulated generation market, degree to which generators different compete with one another depends on capacity to transmit electricity between locations. We study impact of capacity on competition among generators. We show that there may be no relationship between effect of a line in spurring competition and actual that flows on line. We then investigate the equilibria that are likely to result as lines between previously unconnected locations are built and expanded. We demonstrate that limited capacity can give a firm the incentive to restrict its output in order to congest into its area of dominance. This analysis is applied to a model of California's forthcoming deregulated market. Our results indicate that at least one firm could have an incentive to strategically induce transmission congestion and that relatively small investments in may yield surprisingly large payoffs in terms of increased competition.