Preferential Trade Agreements and the GATT: Can Bilateralism and Multilateralism Coexist?
通过区分约束型与非约束型国家，研究双边贸易协定何时会危及多边协定，发现约束型国家加入特惠协定会收紧多边约束，而非约束型国家则不会。
By distinguishing constraining and nonconstraining nations, the authors model when bilateral trade agreements jeopardize a multilateral one. The results illuminate differential concerns over 'Fortress Europe,' a Japan-centered Asian bloc, and the Canada-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement and proposed NAFTA. If a constraining nation enters a preferential trade agreement, that country will offset its bilateral liberalization by more tightly constraining the multilateral agreement; therefore, preferential trade agreements by 'foot draggers' may jeopardize existing multilateral agreements. Preferential trade agreements by nonconstraining countries, in contrast, allow willing countries to liberalize further without jeopardizing existing agreements; such preferential trade agreements need not reduce the extent of multilateral liberalization and may increase it. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG