Adverse Selection and Employment Cycles
构建了一个动态逆向选择模型，其中企业从失业者中雇佣工人，并随时间观察其生产率，最终解雇低效工人。当雇佣成本足够高时，系统会收敛到企业交替雇佣和不雇佣的周期性均衡。
This article examines a dynamic adverse-selection model that generates equilibrium employment cycles. In the model, firms hire workers from unemployment, observe workers' productivity through time, and (following the profit-maximizing rule) eventually fire unproductive workers. If hiring costs are low, the dynamical system converges to a steady state in which the unemployment pool contains mostly low-ability workers. However, if hiring costs are sufficiently large, this 'lemons effect' would make firms unwilling to hire workers. In this case, the system converges to a cyclical equilibrium in which firms alternate between hiring and not hiring. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.