Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement
构建了一个不可转移效用的双边搜索模型，分析单身人士的自我提升与求婚策略，发现自我提升决策存在两种外部性，可能导致多重帕累托可排序均衡，其中社会鼓励自我提升反而迫使所有人为了“可接受”而提升，但可能存在更优的均衡减少不必要的自我提升。
This article examines equilibrium self‐improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated—some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self‐improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self‐improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain “acceptable.” But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self‐improvement.