Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems
研究了美国Fedwire系统中银行因依赖对手方资金而采取的谨慎行为如何通过乘数效应放大对支付系统整体功能的负面影响，并量化了这种相互强化的机制。
In large‐value real‐time gross settlement payment systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to finance outgoing payments. Such reliance necessitates a high degree of coordination and synchronization. We construct a model of a payment system calibrated for the U.S. Fedwire system and examine the impact of realistic disruptions motivated by the recent financial crisis. In such settings, individually cautious behavior can have a significant and detrimental impact on the overall functioning of the payment system through a multiplier effect. Our results quantify the mutually reinforcing nature of greater caution, and allow comparative statics analysis of shifts in key parameters.