母亲身份工资惩罚:哪些母亲承受了惩罚以及为什么?

The Motherhood Wage Penalty: Which Mothers Pay It and Why?

American Economic Review · 2002
被引 302
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究母亲身份对工资的影响,发现高技能女性因离职育儿面临更大工资惩罚,而低技能女性可能因人力资本较少而免受惩罚。

Abstract

Studies of the motherhood wage penalty typically focus on the “pure” effect of children, holding all else equal. But as all parents know, the arrival of a child means that nothing stays the same. One change especially salient to labor economists is that many mothers exit the work force. Absences from the labor market are likely to reduce wages because general and firmspecific skills depreciate and workers lose rents associated with good job matches. Low-skilled workers may be less vulnerable to such earnings erosion, since they have less human capital and their wages reflect less rent. If so, these workers may escape a motherhood wage penalty. Conversely, we would expect highly skilled women to experience the largest penalties for exiting the labor force to care for their children.

母职工资惩罚劳动力退出技能折旧低技能劳动者高技能劳动者