Durable-Goods Monopolists
耐用品垄断者因二手市场存在而面临特殊问题，若无法租赁或承诺未来产量，会生产更低耐用品，且可能比租赁者减少固定投资，甚至造成更大无谓损失。
Durable-goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist. To the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated. Given the inability to do the above, the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns. A reverse Averch-Johnson result--that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs (including plant modernization and research and development) than would the renters--is shown. It is also shown that, even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable-goods monopolists, it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies.