Egalitarianism and Incentives
一群代理人共同生产并共享产出，但个体自私行为与集体福利最大化冲突导致效率损失。本文证明，社会福利函数越平等，效率损失反而越小。
A group of agents is collectively engaged in a joint productive activity. Each agent supplies an observable input, and output is then collectively shared among the members. A Bergson–Samuelson welfare function defined on individual utilities describes the social values of the agents. However, individual actions are taken on a selfish basis. The collective decision cannot be precommitted, and is made (after inputs are chosen) to maximize welfare conditional on the input decisions. This leads to inefficiency. The aim of this paper is to show formally that, contrary to popular belief, the degree of inefficiencydecreasesin the extent of egalitarianism embodied in the social welfare function.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D30, D63, P13.