Optimal Income Distribution Rules and Representative Consumers
推导了具有最优收入分配规则的经济体的可观测性质，该规则将消费者收入表示为总收入和价格的函数。最优性意味着总需求函数由单一代表性消费者生成，并进一步推导出当消费者获得固定收入份额时，总收入上升会导致需求更加分散，该条件有实证支持。
This paper derives observable properties of economies with optimal income distribution rules that specify consumers' incomes as functions of aggregate income and prices. Optimality implies that the aggregate demand function is generated by a single "representative" consumer, cf. Samuelson (1956). We derive an additional implication which, when consumers receive fixed shares of aggregate income, requires that the consumers' demands become more dispersed when aggregate income rises. This last condition has empirical support. The results relate the representative consumer's preferences to a version of Kaldor's compensation criterion and show when both can be used for normative analysis without internal inconsistency.