Bidding with Securities: Comment
评论了DeMarzo等人（2005）关于证券拍卖的结论，通过假设更高回报需要更高投资成本，发现更陡峭的证券更易受逆向选择影响，可能带来更低预期收入。
Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz (2005) analyzed auctions in which bidders compete in securities. They show that a steeper security leads to a higher expected revenue for the seller, and also use this to establish the revenue ranking between standard auctions. In this comment, we obtain the opposite results to DKS's by assuming that a higher return requires a higher investment cost. Given this latter assumption, steeper securities are more vulnerable to adverse selection, and may yield lower expected revenue, than flatter ones.