Valuation and Control in Venture Finance
构建了风险投资家与创业者之间的模型，分析创业者从控制权中获得私人非金钱收益时，风险投资家如何要求超出其股权比例的控制权，并通过融资条款、信息租金和风险分担来补偿创业者。
ABSTRACT This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.