Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay for Performance: An Experimental Investigation
通过真实努力的实验室实验，比较绩效薪酬与固定薪酬，发现前者通过筛选效应（高生产率员工自选绩效薪酬）和激励效应（所有员工在绩效薪酬下产出更高）显著提升企业生产率，但风险规避者更少选择且对激励反应较弱。
Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real—effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay—for—performance and fixed—salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk—averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.