Learning and incentive‐Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study
首次系统实验比较了两种激励相容的公共物品提供机制：Groves-Ledyard基本二次机制和Walker配对差异机制。实验表明，高惩罚参数下的基本二次机制表现优于低惩罚参数下的同一机制，后者又优于配对差异机制。
This is the first systematic experimental study of the comparative performance of two incentive‐compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the basic quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard and the paired‐difference mechanism by Walker. Our experiments demonstrate that the performance of the basic quadratic mechanism under a high punishment parameter is far better than that of the same mechanism under a low punishment parameter, which, in turn, is better than that of the paired‐difference mechanism. We estimate three individual behavioral models: an exponentialized relative payoff sum model outperforms the generalized fictitious play model. We also provide a sufficient condition for convergence under the basic quadratic mechanism.