Professional influence: the effects of investment banks on clients' acquisition financing and performance
研究了投资银行如何利用专业能力引导客户选择股票融资收购，并发现客户在后续收购中更可能再次雇佣该银行，但这类收购往往导致较差的绩效。
Abstract This study examines the conditions in which professional firms use client engagements to get clients to subsequently hire them. The central thesis is that professional firms derive power from their specialized expertise and lead clients towards complex problems that apply the expertise. In particular, relative to cash‐financed acquisitions, stock‐financed acquisitions more intensively apply investment banks' expertise. Consistent with expectations, results from a sample of 404 acquisitions show that firms are more likely to hire banks on stock‐financed acquisitions when they have previously used banks. Evidence also suggests that clients that hire banks on such acquisitions are prone to adverse performance from them. Overall, these results suggest that professional firms lead clients to complex solutions with problematic outcomes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.