The Role of Dividends, Debt and Board Structure in the Governance of Family Controlled Firms
研究家族控制企业如何利用股利、债务和董事会结构来影响控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题，发现家族企业比非家族企业采用更高的股利支付率、更高的债务水平和更低的董事会独立性，且股利和债务在抑制家族侵占中小股东财富方面更有效。
Abstract: We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non‐family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner‐manager conflict in non‐family firms.