EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL YARDSTICK COMPETITION IN FRANCE USING A TWO‐REGIME SPATIAL DURBIN MODEL WITH FIXED EFFECTS*
提出两区制空间杜宾模型，排除其他空间交互效应，利用法国93个省1992-2000年福利支出数据，发现政治多数较小的省份更倾向于模仿邻省的福利支出，证实了政治标尺竞争的存在。
ABSTRACT This research proposes a two‐regime spatial Durbin model with spatial and time‐period fixed effects to test for political yardstick competition and exclude any other explanation that might produce spatial interaction effects among the dependent variable, the independent variables, or the error term. The study also derives the maximum likelihood estimator and variance–covariance matrix of the parameters of this model. Data pertaining to welfare spending by 93 departments in France during 1992–2000 provide significant empirical evidence in support of political yardstick competition. Departments governed by a small political majority mimic neighboring expenditures on welfare to a greater extent than do departments governed by a large political majority.