An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game
通过实验比较标准信任博弈与角色反转版本，发现当第二行动者的合作具有生产力时，信任概率降低但合作概率提高，且第一行动者未能预见这一变化，暗示市场应让买方先行动。
Abstract In the standard trust game the surplus is increased by the risk taking first mover while cooperation by the second mover is a one-to-one transfer. This paper reports results from experiments in which the reverse holds; the first mover's risky trust is not productive and the second mover's cooperation is productive. This subtle difference significantly lowers the likelihood of trust but increases the likelihood of cooperation conditional on trust. Evidence is presented that the change in trust is consistent with first movers failing to anticipate the later result. Drawing upon the analogy that the trust game represents a model of exchange, the results suggest that markets should be organized so that the buyer moves first and not the seller as in the original trust game.