Worker Cooperation and the Ratchet Effect
计件工资下工人会隐瞒新技术以防企业降低单价，导致产出受限。竞争环境下此结果不可避免，但非竞争情形下企业可通过计件工资获得工人合作。
Workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output, but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money. Workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves. We show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment. However, there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers. These predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in England in the nineteenth century and the Lincoln Electric Company in the United States even today. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.