The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
研究双边匹配市场（如买卖、雇佣、婚姻）的核心结构，证明其具有良好性质，能解决瓦尔拉斯均衡在唯一性和可操纵性上的问题，对市场设计研究者有参考价值。
We study two-sided in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability. THE IDEA OF USING Walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively. The scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions. The competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly. In general this procedure may run into two difficulties: first, nonuniqueness-if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented; and second, manipulability-if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data. However, as we will show here, using the Walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets. These are the matching markets of our title and they include for single items, like houses, where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item. They also include labor in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries, academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions, marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries. It turns out that in these both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a