Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
分析主权债务模型，其中重新谈判自然发生。由于信息不完全，重新谈判博弈存在多重均衡，标准契约理论与均衡精炼方法对效率策略的选择存在冲突，引发对契约问题分析方式的深层思考。
A model of sovereign debt is analyzed. In this model, renegotiation arises in a natural way. Because information is incomplete, the renegotiation game has many equilibria. The standard contract theory approach suggests that the parties should agree to choose the efficient equilibrium strategies when the contract is written. Refinements of the equilibrium notion, such as strategic stability, suggest that a very inefficient equilibrium may be chosen. The tension between these two approaches raises deep questions about the correct way to analyze a large class of contracting problems. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.