Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships
利用医疗集团实践数据，研究合伙经营中风险分散与道德风险的权衡，发现风险厌恶导致收入共享增加，但显著降低医生努力水平，暗示从按服务收费转向按人头付费会大幅减少医生努力。
Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradeoff. Risk aversion leads to compensation arrangements, which spread risk through greater sharing of revenues. We find that compensation arrangements with greater degrees of revenue sharing significantly reduce physician effort. The results imply that changing the method of physician payment from fee-for-service to capitation will dramatically reduce physician effort.