Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values
通过实验检验一个内生时机投资模型，发现被试相对于纳什均衡过度投资，且行为在不同实验处理间几乎不变，提出基于有限理性经验法则的解释。
We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium.