The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses
研究19世纪美国银行清算所如何通过监控银行活动和建立管理控制机制，降低存款增加带来的信息不对称成本，并在金融恐慌中创造风险分担工具（贷款凭证）来应对信息问题。
During nineteenth century, deposits increased relative to bank notes, c ausing increased information-asymmetry problems in banking. This pape r describes how bank clearinghouses lowered these costs by monitoring bank activities and establishing mechanisms of managerial control, i n effect regulating bank behavior. Such actions enforced loca l one-to-one exchange rate between deposits and specie. Clearinghouse s increased regulation during financial panics, creating and enforcin g a risk-sharing device (loan certificates) for addressing panic-rela ted information problems. This paper concludes that the market's capacity to control bank managers depends on banking product mix, and more generally, on information costs. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.