Feasible and Continuous Implementation
构造了一个博弈形式，其纳什均衡集与所有纯交换经济中的（受约束的）瓦尔拉斯均衡集一致，且该博弈形式在均衡和非均衡策略下都是可行且连续的。
There has been a great deal of research in recent years investigating the question of whether or not there exist institutions (game forms) for which the set of equilibria will coincide with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper we show the existence of a game form that is feasible, both for equilibrium and disequilibrium strategies, continuous, and for which the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of (constrained) Walrasian equilibria for all pure exchange economies. The game form allows agents to behave strategically both with respect to their preferences and their initial endowments.