Elected Leaders, Community and Development: Evidence on Distribution and Agency from a Case in India
结合结构方程模型与民族志方法，研究印度民选地方机构（潘查亚特）领导人如何分配发展资源，发现民主分权缓解了精英俘获，但政治掮客为争取选票而扩大分配范围。
Abstract Although democratic decentralisation or community development by elected leaders is hypothesised to broaden development, there is little evidence on just how elected leaders make distributional decisions and far less on how communities in turn shape their leaders' decisions. This study combines structural equation modelling with ethnography in India to investigate how leaders of elected local bodies called panchayats distribute development. While quantitative findings reveal that democratic decentralisation mitigates elite capture, ethnography gives insight into the role of political brokers in brokering development for votes, widening distribution to non elite groups.