Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings
基于1978年破产改革法案下的30个样本，测量了股东在重组中获得的超出绝对优先规则的部分，平均占总索赔额的7.6%，并发现股价反映了这些预期偏离。
ABSTRACT Claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. We measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents, on average, 7.6% of the total awarded to all claimants. Evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority, suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets.