The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations
研究选举期间货币政策是否被政治操纵。在发达国家和拥有独立中央银行的发展中国家未发现政治性货币周期，但在缺乏中央银行独立性的发展中国家发现了证据，且这些周期并非由选举相关的财政扩张货币化引起，可能是政治家施压中央银行利用菲利普斯曲线所致。
This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections. We do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks. We do find evidence, however, in developing countries that lack central bank independence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election‐related fiscal expansions. This suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the Phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles.