Compliance, Avoidance, and Evasion: Emissions Control under Imperfect Enforcement in Steam-Electric Generation
构建联合生产模型，估计飞灰和热废热排放标准对蒸汽发电企业技术选择的影响，发现执法力度是决定飞灰控制成本的关键因素，且成本远高于以往估计。
Environmental regulation takes place in a world in which firms search for least-cost adaptations to emission standards. Firms may substitute inputs, change the desired level of output, or defy the standard, if they perceive enforcement to be lax. This article estimates the impact of pollution-control standards for fly-ash and thermal-waste heat within a joint model of production. The model recognizes that effective control requires both the enactment and the enforcement of the legal standard. Empirical results, substantially different from those of previous studies, show that the level of enforcement is an important determinant offly-ashcontrol costs and that fly-ash-control costs are many times greater than previously estimated. a This article estimates the effects of pollution-control standards, for both fly-ash and thermal emissions, on the ex ante technology of steam-electric generation. I model the firm as both a cost avoider and a cost evader. As a cost avoider, the firm decides on the least costly emissions-control strategy within the legal environment. One possible fly-ash-control strategy is to substitute oil or gas for coal. As a cost evader, the firm may choose not to comply with the legal emissions standard. The expected cost of evasion will decrease as enforcement becomes more lax. This increases the opportunity for successful evasion. I model this relationship by explicitly including an enforcement variable. To model emissions control I use a joint production framework that captures potential interdependent effects between electric generation and emissions control. My analysis suggests that both the fly-ash standard and its degree of enforcement are important determinants of the marginal costs of fly-ash control. I find that the costs are several times greater than those previous studies have estimated. The results suggest that firms substituted gas or oil for coal to reduce the anticipated costs of fly-ash control and that the level of the fly-ash-emission standard and the degree of enforcement altered desired plant output. In what follows, I first review previous studies of fly-ash and thermal-waste heat control and discuss several modelling issues that affect estimates of firms' responses to an emissions