Competition in a Repeated Spatial Auction Market with an Application to Timber Sales
构建了一个重复空间拍卖模型，发现竞标者会因未来单位的位置偏好而低于净估值出价，导致非帕累托最优结果，并用美国林务局木材销售数据验证。
In this paper we develop a model of a repeated spatial auction market. The auction model contributes to the literature on spatial competition by considering the sale of goods in a market with spatial and temporal dimensions, and in which goods are sold by an auction institution instead of a posted‐price institution. In the Nash equilibrium of the spatial auction model, each bidder is found to have a dominance solvable strategy to bid below his net (of transportation costs) valuation for the first unit of the good because there is an option value to not winning, namely that the following units may be locationally preferred to the first unit. The equilibrium bidding strategies lead to the possibility of non–Pareto‐efficient outcomes. The auction model is applied to data from U.S. Forest Service timber sales.