Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of Ceo Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance
研究了CEO股票期权如何影响战略行为和公司绩效，发现期权促使CEO进行高方差赌注而非单纯加大投资，导致极端业绩（大赢或大亏），且大亏多于大赢。
We unpack the concept of managerial risk taking, distinguishing among three of its major elements: the size of an outlay, the variance of potential outcomes, and the likelihood of extreme loss. We then apply our framework in hypothesizing the effects of CEO stock options on strategic behavior and company performance. We find that CEO stock options engender high levels of investment outlays and bring about extreme corporate performance (big gains and big losses), suggesting that stock options prompt CEOs to make high-variance bets, not simply larger bets. Finally, we find that option-loaded CEOs deliver more big losses than big gains.