Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability
研究风险中性企业与风险厌恶员工之间的契约，假设企业在一段雇佣后私下了解工人能力，外部劳动力市场试图从企业裁员等行为推断工人质量，导致最优契约扭曲，裁员可能非自愿且超过有效水平。
This paper examines the contract between a risk-neutral firm and its risk-averse employees, assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment. Employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm (such as the number of workers it lays off). The threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract. Layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels. A seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability.