Equilibrium Bank Runs
分析了一个存款合约类型广泛的银行系统，证明在所谓的“最优合约”下，存款后博弈可能存在挤兑均衡，从而在Diamond-Dybvig框架内解释了银行挤兑作为均衡现象的出现。
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broad. The mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint, but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed. Consumers must be willing to deposit, ex ante. We show, by examples, that under the so-called "optimal contract, " the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium. Given a propensity to run, triggered by sunspots, the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability. Thus the Diamond-Dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract.