Unilateral Resource Management in a Two‐Country General Equilibrium Model of Trade in a Renewable Fishery Resource
研究在产权不完全的情况下，两国间可再生自然资源自由贸易的影响，发现单边资源管理可能降低双方福利，并探讨关税、补贴等政策如何减少损失。
Abstract We explore the effects of free trade in a renewable natural resource between two countries in the presence of incomplete property rights. While resource management by one country may benefit one or both trading partners, we demonstrate that resource management by only one of the partners may reduce welfare for both, when compared to the case in which neither manages its resource sector. These trade‐induced losses may be reduced through import tariffs and production subsidies on the resource good or by permitting harvest beyond the rent‐maximizing level. Our preliminary work suggests that the World Trade Organization (WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) policy makers should not always insist on free trade and resource management. Rather, they must pay careful attention to the particular relationships between trade conditions and natural resource policies among trading nations.