Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly
研究在非合作微分博弈中，m个寡头企业开采共有不可再生资源的马尔可夫纳什-古诺均衡产出，并讨论企业数量及私人与社会贴现率差异对福利的影响。
Output in a Markov Nash-Cournot equilibrium to a noncooperative differential game in which m oligopolists extract a common property nonrenewable resource is bounded by the output of m-firm and (m - 1)-firm static oligopolies. The author discusses the welfare effects of the number of firms and of the divergence between private and social discount rates. He compares extraction under the Markov and open-loop equilibria and then offers an explanation for the possibility that the resource is exhausted instantaneously in a continuous time game. This explanation does not depend on the fact that the period of commitment is infinitesimal. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.