The Maturity Rat Race
研究了为何企业尤其是金融机构偏好短期融资，发现期限竞赛导致借款人缩短债务期限以稀释其他债权人，最终造成均衡融资期限过短。
ABSTRACT Why do some firms, especially financial institutions, finance themselves so short‐term? We show that extreme reliance on short‐term financing may be the outcome of a maturity rat race : a borrower may have an incentive to shorten the maturity of an individual creditor's debt contract because this dilutes other creditors. In response, other creditors opt for shorter maturity contracts as well. This dynamic toward short maturities is present whenever interim information is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default. For borrowers that cannot commit to a maturity structure, equilibrium financing is inefficiently short‐term.