Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing and Investment?
研究分析师异常关注是否影响公司的外部融资和投资决策，发现高关注公司融资更多、投资过度且未来回报更低，支持分析师偏好有投行业务潜力公司的假设。
We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self‐selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment‐banking business.