The Economics of Maintenance for Real Estate Investments
研究了负面需求冲击后物业经理暂停维护的现象，发现维护的利润门槛高于初始投资，导致新投资优于维护，并分析了合同要求维护对补贴成本的影响。
We propose a theory of urban decay. Following a negative real estate demand shock, property managers optimally suspend maintenance and the probability that they ever restart can be modest. Because maintenance expenditures are proportionately less risky than are the incremental building profits they generate, managers impose a more demanding profit standard on maintenance than on the initial investment. This differential in profit standards means that rather than maintain existing investments, property managers favor new investments, which, if marginally acceptable, they also leave unmaintained. Contractually required maintenance ( e.g ., for publicly subsidized real estate investments), increases the minimum profit for the initial investment acceptance and discourages subsidized real estate investments in favor of unsubsidized investments. However, the required profit for acceptance of a permanently maintained investment is below the profit boundary for maintenance if maintenance is not contractually required. Consequently, the subsidy that induces the investment is least expensive if maintenance is not required, more expensive if maintenance is permanently required and most expensive if maintenance is induced immediately after initial construction but thereafter is at the discretion of the manager. All of our findings are strongest for poorer quality properties.